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Introduction 
 
A central theme that recurs in many chapters in this volume is the changing 
role that COSATU now plays in the post-apartheid political dispensation. 
The systemic political and legislative reforms ushered in by the ANC in the 
1990s were designed not to usher in a socialist society, the ardently-desired 
goal of many union activists in the 1980s (Lewis, 1986; Pityana and Orkin, 
1992), but a deracialised and stable capitalism (see McKinley and Lehulere, 
this volume). The essential conditions of labour subordination therefore 
remain, only now overlain at a national level with a social democratic 
political structure with a black complexion. This structure has taken the 
form of a corporatist political arrangement centred on the Tripartite 
Alliance and NEDLAC. Tripartism has yielded the unions certain historical 
gains, including the passage of relatively progressive labour relations 
legislation, including some elements of the Labour Relations Act 1995, the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997, the Employment Equity Act 
1998, and the Skills Development Act 1999. As a result of this legislation, 
trade unions have now achieved what Gramsci (1919) called ‘industrial 
legality’, whereby the restrictions on managerial arbitrariness mark a 
historical advance for trade unions. In many respects, therefore, the 
institutionalisation of unions that occurred in the 1990s is a significant gain 
for the black workers of South Africa who were denied any role in the old 
political order.  
The question that is tackled in this chapter is whether these gains 
have come at the price of neutering much of the dynamism that made the 
federation such an explosive force for change in the 1980s. Specifically, 
can COSATU and its affiliates continue to be regarded as a model of social 
movement unionism (SMU), which comprises the following elements: 
mass mobilisation of members; internal democracy; broad social 
objectives; alliances with progressive social movements; functional 
independence from political parties; and recognition of diverse membership 
(Lambert and Webster, 1988; Waterman, 1993, 1999; Scipes, 1993; 
Seidman, 1994)? Or, have the processes of bureaucratisation and 
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routinisation evident in most Western unions after their initial explosive 
growth period (Webb and Webb, 1920; Lester, 1958; Michels, 1962) now 
become dominant? 
The continued existence of social movement unionism as a moving 
force in South African unions has been debated by many commentators. 
Much of it suggests that SMU has survived, albeit in a modified form. 
Hirschsohn (1998), for example, while suggesting that it is ‘premature [in 
the late 1990s] to assess whether COSATU still exemplifies SMU’ 
(Hirschsohn, 1998, p. 661), favours on balance a relatively ‘optimistic’ 
assessment. Hirschsohn admits several potential or actual problems 
affecting the continued survival of SMU in COSATU. These include 
organisational problems arising out of rapid growth and incorporation into 
centralised bargaining and economic policy making, the ‘brain-drain’ of 
leaders evident from shop stewards to general secretaries, declining 
participation levels by rank and file members, the transformation of 
representative structures to mere conduits of communication, and the 
steady erosion of worker control over policy issues (Hirschsohn, 1998, pp. 
660–1). While some of these, Hirschsohn believes, are inevitable 
accompaniments of the growth of the federation, the end of the struggle 
against apartheid, and the need for ‘bureaucratisation and 
professionalisation… to serve members efficiently’ (Hirschsohn, 1998, p. 
661), COSATU does face potential problems. According to Hirschsohn, 
‘[I]f links with local communities disintegrate and COSATU narrows its 
social agenda to focus just on labour issues’ it will simply ‘mature into an 
independent form of political unionism’ common in the West (Hirschsohn, 
1998, p. 662). If, furthermore, worker control and membership participation 
falls away, this would ‘signify the degeneration of SMU into a form of 
political unionism potentially captive of political forces’ (Hirschsohn, 
1998, p. 662).  
While recognising the danger of COSATU’s mutation into more 
conventional forms of political unionism, Hirschsohn (1998) appears to 
favour an interpretation that SMU is still intact in its essentials, using for 
evidence the 1994 survey of more than 600 COSATU members by 
Ginsburg and Webster (1995) which found evidence of worker control over 
shop stewards and a vibrant democratic and participative culture at 
grassroots level. Hirschsohn (1998) suggests, furthermore, that SMU may 
be advanced in the South African context by the federation’s adoption of 
‘strategic unionism’, combining ‘negotiation inside the institutionalised 
political and industrial relations framework and collective action outside’ 
(Hirschsohn, 1998, p. 662). This, he suggests, takes SMU ‘a step further’ – 
‘whereas SMU involves mobilization around a common set of demands, 
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strategic unionism requires commitment to a coherent developmental vision 
and a program of economic, social and political transformation’ 
(Hirschsohn, 1998, p. 660).  
Ginsburg and Webster’s (1995) study was replicated four years later 
by Wood and Psoulis (2001), who suggest that COSATU affiliates have 
been ‘able to check oligarchic tendencies’ and that ‘the overwhelming 
majority of COSATU members continue to actively participate in the 
internal democratic life of their unions’ (Wood and Psoulis, 2001, p. 300). 
The result is that ‘COSATU has thus reaffirmed its social movement role’ 
(Wood and Psoulis, 2001, p. 310). The study finds, inter alia, widespread 
involvement in strike action (66 per cent of respondents reported having 
taken strike action on one or more occasions since 1994, a figure rising to 
85 per cent in manufacturing), regular attendance at union meetings (71 per 
cent reported attending meetings more than once a month, only a small 
drop from the 76 per cent in the 1994 survey), support from other unions 
during strikes (31 per cent), a strong interest in party political matters, and a 
willingness to take ‘mass action’ in the event that the Government does not 
deliver on its promises. The result, according to Wood and Psoulis (2001, 
p. 310), is that COSATU ‘remains one of the most effective trade union 
federations in the world’.  
Similar to Hirschsohn (1998), Adler and Webster (1995) point to 
problems increasingly evident within COSATU and its affiliates since onset 
of political transition in the early 1990s. One is the breaking of the mandate 
principle, as peak union representatives increasingly strike deals with 
employers and government representatives without referral back to 
members. The second factor is ‘a growing gap between leadership and the 
base’ (Adler and Webster, 1995, p. 96), with locals turning into ‘the passive 
recipients of the national directives’, and the decline of the motivating 
union vision (Marie, 1992). Third is the domination of the ANC within the 
Tripartite Alliance (Adler and Webster, 1995, p. 98). They conclude that ‘if 
the labor movement does not address the problems head on, it … runs the 
risk of bureaucratisation and co-option, with its power – historically based 
on its capacity for disciplined mobilization – slowly ebbing away’ (Adler 
and Webster, 1995, p. 99). Nonetheless, they too point to the Ginsburg and 
Webster (1995) survey as evidence that any further tendencies in this 
direction will be met by stiff resistance from members as ‘the principles of 
radical reform remain deeply embedded in the culture of the organization 
[COSATU]’ (Adler and Webster, 1995, p. 98).  
Other writers are more doubtful that much remains of SMU within 
COSATU. Incipient trends towards demobilisation evident even before the 
fall of apartheid (Keet, 1992; Marie, 1992; Rees, 1992) have since 1994 
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become fully fledged (Gall, 1997; Bezuidenhout, 1999; Clarke and Bassett, 
1999). There is a variety of evidence pointing to the weakening of many of 
COSATU’s original organising principles. One is the question of union 
demands, and the way in which they have been re-framed and 
fundamentally changed in the process. For example, one of the key union 
demands in the 1980s was for worker control. This involved not just 
fighting over ‘manning’ rates of equipment, dealing with noxious fumes 
and excessive heat, but also driving out racist supervisors and managers. 
Since the early 1990s, however, the demand for control at work has been 
increasingly channelled into involvement in industry restructuring 
committees modelled explicitly on the Australian experience in the 1980s. 
COSATU affiliates have in the past decade increasingly taken 
responsibility for cutting costs at work in an attempt to achieve 
international competitiveness for the South African business sector. 
NUMSA has been a leading proponent of this strategy since the early 
1990s, but other unions have also moved in this direction (Desai, 1995; von 
Holdt, 1995; Maree and Godfrey, 1995; Catchpowle et al, 1998, Rachleff, 
2001).  
Likewise, the labour reforms of the mid-1990s have allowed the 
black unions some influence over terms and conditions of employment and 
rights to organise, but, some writers suggest, this has been matched by a 
retreat from a frontal challenge to the employer ‘right to manage’ to an 
acceptance of the needs of productivity and competitiveness under the 
rubric of ‘strategic unionism’ (Gall, 1997; Barchiesi, 1999).  
The changing industrial and political character of COSATU  may 
also be illustrated by the decline in the strike rate, the Wood and Psoulis 
(2001) survey data notwithstanding. At the height of the struggle against 
apartheid in the late 1980s, the number of strike days peaked at nine 
million. In the five years 1990–94, the number of strike days was 
approximately four million each year. In the years following the 1994 
elections the number of strike days fell sharply, to 650,000 by 1997. In 
1998 and 1999, there was something of a recovery, but the figure then fell 
back again to only half a million in 2000 (South African Institute for Race 
Relations, 2001). The overall trend is for a decrease in militant strike 
activity, but with an increase in the relatively symbolic centrally-controlled 
‘days of action’ aimed at strengthening the negotiating leverage of the 
COSATU leadership in Tripartite Alliance discussions (see McKinley and 
van Driel, this volume).  
Although the rapid increase in retrenchments in core areas of union 
strength has been an important factor curbing union militancy, more 
significant has been the widespread political disorientation arising from the 
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changed political environment post-1994. Who, now, black workers ask, is 
the real enemy? Under apartheid it was clear – the enemy was the racist 
state and its apartheid structures. Now, under the rhetoric of the ‘national 
democratic revolution’, whose second stage has been indefinitely 
suspended, there is no clear line of march for union members and activists. 
Is the ANC Government an enemy when it announces plans to privatise the 
state airline, electricity, water, garbage collection, and the railways, or 
when it pursues its neo-liberal GEAR programme? Or is the ANC 
Government merely undertaking the necessary measures required to free up 
funds for social development? Is the ANC Government itself the enemy, or 
is it, perhaps, only its misguided policies? What attitude should workers 
take to the ANC Government when it works closely with Volkswagen 
management in the dismissal of 1,300 car workers? (Rachleff, 2001).  
Workers seeking to clarify the new lines of power and loyalties in the 
new political dispensation are discouraged from doing so by leading figures 
in the labour movement aligned to the SACP, forever endeavouring to lend 
the ANC Government a ‘working-class bias’ (see McKinley, this volume). 
The wholesale redeployment of a generation of union leaders and the tight 
personal connections that exist between union leaders and senior 
government figures also contributes to the mystification process that 
shrouds the current political alignment. These poachers-turned-
gamekeepers lend credibility to Government measures that would have 
been steadfastly resisted had they emanated from the National Party 
Government prior to 1994. The result at grassroots level is widespread 
bewilderment, demoralisation, and a perception that the union movement is 
beating a continual retreat, as admitted in COSATU’s 1997 September 
Commission Report. 
In order to shed light on the question as to the continuing existence 
or otherwise of social movement unionism within COSATU, I present my 
own findings based on fieldwork in the Wits East region of NUMSA in the 
period 1997 to 2001.1 The Wits East region of NUMSA, centred on the 
East Rand, the heartland of the nation’s engineering industry, comprises six 
locals: Springs, Wadeville, Germiston, Alrode, Benoni and Germiston. 
NUMSA membership in 2001 in this region was approximately 30,000, 
concentrated mostly in the engineering sector. The largest plant is Scaw 
Metals (forge, foundry work and moulding), which is owned by the Anglo 
American Corporation and which employs 4,500 workers (2,500–3,000 of 
whom are NUMSA members). Most of the medium to larger sized 
engineering companies in the East Rand are members of the Steel and 
Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA). 
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In my assessment of SMU, I focus on what I believe to be the most 
important element of social movement unionism, namely the presence of 
representative and participatory democracy (including factory-level 
membership mobilisation). Consideration is also given, however, to 
independence from political parties and links to non-workplace political 
struggles.  
 
 
Representative and participatory democracy 
 
Changes in representative and participatory democracy within NUMSA  in 
the East Rand cannot be divorced from the context of industrial and 
political demobilisation that occurred during the 1990s. Indeed, 
participatory democracy is, in large part, synonymous with membership 
mobilisation. It has long been understood by union activists internationally 
that members’ participation in their union comes alive during industrial 
campaigns, and this is certainly true in South Africa, where the significance 
of the strike in fostering SMU in the 1980s cannot be exaggerated. The 
Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) in Transvaal, forerunner of 
NUMSA, was effectively built by strikes (FOSATU Annual Report, 1982, 
cited in Ruiters, 1995, p. 106) which were the workers’ basic weapon. As 
one long-time NUMSA shop steward, now organiser, Tebogo, explained:  
 
NUMSA has been a striking union, that’s our character. If you don’t 
strike for two or three years, your members forget about you. What 
used to unite people was the strike (interview, 2001).  
 
Or, as Vusi, NUMSA organiser since 1984, put it: ‘Strikes play a key role. 
Without the strike, you can forget about the union’ (interview, 2001). 
The situation today is rather different. The Labour Relations Act 
(LRA), although doing much to protect shop stewards from victimisation, 
at least in the larger plants, also prohibits strikes at any time over disputes 
of right (including disputes over dismissals or victimisation) or over 
disputes of interest during the life of an agreement. The impact has been 
dramatic. As Thami, an organiser first active in the mid-1980s, explained: 
 
The hands and feet of the workers are tied by the LRA itself. It’s not 
like before when we don’t agree, we bang the table and say ‘We’re 
walking out of this factory and you’ll face the consequence of the 
workers!’. And there’ll be a stoppage of the workers. So now it’s not 
the same. As an official, I’ll ring up and say ‘Comrades, you know 
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what you need to do now. You’ll have to declare a dispute’ 
(interview, Thami, 2001).  
 
This diversion of workers’ grievances towards formal channels of 
dispute resolution has a detrimental impact on the fighting spirit of the 
workers, and at times requires the organiser to act as an industrial police 
officer. Tebogo described a not untypical exchange: 
 
Workers would want to go back to the olden days, but now you 
can’t. I tell the workers you can’t go on strike over this issue … If 
the workers say, ‘No, we must strike. This is our chance to get this 
manager who is not a human being. We just want to strike to show 
him that we are people’. I led many strikes. Now I must tell the 
workers, ‘No you can’t go out on strike’. It hurts me most of all 
(interview, 2001). 
 
There are occasions, then, when rank and file members and union 
officials come into conflict on the question of whether or not to strike. 
However, the new labour relations environment is also breeding passivity 
within the ranks of the union and a growing dependence on paid union 
staff. NUMSA organiser Elias reports that the new system: 
 
… reduces activism at the factory floor. Workers tend to be 
complacent and want everything on a plate. Even issues that they 
have to take up themselves, they say, ‘No, we’ve got an organiser’. 
They come to you and say ‘You’re clever, we know you’re clever’. 
They put you on a pedestal. They channel through you first. This has 
affected the level of activism (interview, 2001).  
 
Vusi, who was elected shop steward in 1979 and became an organiser in 
1984, reported that: 
 
There’s a vast difference between the old days pre-1984, especially 
1990, and now. Before 1990, workers were willing to learn… Now, 
even the smallest thing, an organiser must be involved (interview, 
2001). 
 
A closely related point is that the job of organisers begins to change. 
Their work is increasingly tied up in preparing for legal cases, and they are 
required to spend a considerable amount of their time preparing for 
appearances before the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
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Arbitration, rather than factory-level organising. They become, as one 
organiser put it, ‘para-legals’. For this reason, unions are now devoting 
significantly more resources to legal officers, of which NUMSA now has 
15, one in each region, plus five in the head office. Accompanying these is 
a changing attitude to the law. Once the law was regarded as the instrument 
of oppression by the apartheid state. Now it is regarded as ‘our law’. In the 
1980s, militant unions such as NUMSA used to conduct extensive internal 
debates involving organisers and stewards as to which laws to use and 
which to break by direct action, based on a series of industrial and political 
considerations. Now, however, as the union’s national education officer, 
Dinga Sikwebu, explained: 
 
… what must go to court and what must not go to court is subject to 
the legal department downstairs. Their role and status have become 
so important. We try to ensure worker control over cases through 
dispute committees, but legal expertise rather than strategy is now 
prioritised (interview, Dinga Sikwebu, 2001). 
 
The job of shop stewards has also changed substantially in the new 
labour relations dispensation. The introduction of shop steward facilities, 
including office space, access to telephones and faxes, and access to union 
cars, stop-order facilities (payroll deduction of union dues), and paid time 
off work to attend union business was an important gain for shop stewards 
in the 1980s, particularly at a time when South African unions were 
desperately poor. These resources allowed for better vertical 
communication within the union and for more efficient operation of the 
union within the factory. Two aspects of this trend, however, contribute to a 
weakening of internal democracy. One is the stop-order facility, which has 
been a boon for union finances and has reduced the scope for personal 
corruption available when dues were collected by hand. However, as 
Sikwebu points out, it has also had its disadvantages:  
 
The introduction of stop-order facilities is a conquest for the unions 
but it severs the link. It’s just like you’re paying off the furniture! 
(interview, Dinga Sikwebu, 2001).2  
 
Time off work for union training courses and union conferences is 
another example of a gain which has had some negative ramifications. The 
chair of the Wits East regional executive, Zakhele, argues that:  
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This is shop steward empowerment in terms of labour relations 
skills, management skills, and economic skills. We’re engaged in the 
budget of the country, how we want to see it, and the like (interview, 
2001). 
 
However, the time taken off work by the stewards for training 
courses and conferences may also be contributing to weakening the links 
binding members and their representatives at factory level. If they are 
rarely at work, how can they understand what members need, and how can 
members hold them accountable? The weakening of local steward 
structures is exacerbated by the departure in the 1990s of an entire 
generation of experienced shop stewards resulting from industrial 
restructuring, redundancies, and promotions.  
The broad trends that I have highlighted thus far are suggestive of a 
decline in grassroots mobilisation. How has this affected membership 
involvement in the affairs of their union? Before answering this question, 
however, it is important to confirm that representative democracy is still 
alive within NUMSA in the Wits East region, as the constitutional 
structures that gave MAWU and, later NUMSA, their democratic culture at 
local level are still in place. The key organising body is the Regional 
Executive Committee, which meets monthly and comprises 25 voting 
members – the four regional office bearers (the secretary, two chairpersons 
and treasurer), plus 18 rank and file delegates from the six locals, plus three 
rank and file nominees from the regional finance committee which is 
elected by the regional congress. Only one of these 25, the regional 
secretary, is a full-time official. In addition to these 25 voting members, the 
regional organiser, legal officer, education officer and administration 
officer also sit on the executive in an ex officio non-voting capacity. They 
are appointed by the executive and must report to it. The regional executive 
is in turn elected by a regional congress which meets every three months 
and which comprises delegates elected directly by local shop stewards 
councils on a pro rata basis. No appointed staff member has a vote in any of 
the union’s constitutional structures. These structures ensure that the 
framework for effective representative democracy within NUMSA is still in 
place. 
The same is true at local level. Local shop stewards councils still 
meet weekly, as do factory shop stewards committees, while factory 
general meetings occur weekly or fortnightly in the better organised 
factories. The concepts of mandate and worker control are still held to be 
important, and communication between the regional office and the local 
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offices is still working efficiently, according to union organisers in the 
regional and local offices (interviews, Thami and Sipho, 2001).  
If the union’s democratic structures and formal support for worker 
control and mandate are still much in evidence, it is clear that some of the 
real content of these structures and practices has been lost over the last 
decade. This is obvious firstly in membership attendance at union meetings, 
which is much reduced on the struggle days of the 1980s. Although it is 
hard to make direct comparisons because of the changing structure of locals 
over the years, attendance at local shop steward council meetings on the 
East Rand is down by approximately two-thirds on the early 1990s - in a 
typical local from approximately 150–200 to 60–70. Declining attendance 
is also evident at weekend workshops. This is intimately connected with 
democratic practices in the union, as lower attendance has a direct impact 
on the efficacy of mandate and report-back practices. NUMSA local 
organiser Vusi reported in 2001 that: 
 
Nowadays members aren’t educated about processes; report-backs 
don’t happen. There is poor attendance even at general meetings 
reporting back about wage negotiations. If attendance at the local 
general meeting is 300, then you say ‘At least people have attended’. 
But before you used to say attendance is poor if you got 5,000! 
(interview, 2001). 
 
The regional legal officer and former shop steward, Dumisani, 
reported on the interplay between declining interest amongst the members 
and the decay in shop steward traditions: 
 
Before, the situation was pushing you. Attending a meeting was so 
important. Workers are no longer what they used to be. You came 
back from a weekend meeting, workers armed you on the Friday 
with the arguments, and then early the follow week you reported 
back over two or three days. Today, workers don’t want report-
backs. Delegates are absent as they like. They don’t attend shop 
stewards councils. The policy is that shop stewards must attend 
every shop stewards council, but that is not happening (interview, 
2001). 
 
A series of factors were mentioned by the union’s activists as 
responsible for these trends, the most important of which was the change in 
the overall political situation. Political freedoms have brought workers 
many benefits, but they have had a contradictory effect on the operation of 
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trade unions as struggle organisations. The chairperson of the regional 
executive committee commented that: 
 
The level of activism has really dropped. Pre-1994, there was one 
agenda, that was to liberate South Africa. How, that was not an 
issue. The issue was to see liberation. Activism meant that everyone 
was conscious that ‘I am a black person and cannot vote, I don’t 
have any say in this government. I’m oppressed’. But now everyone 
is saying ‘Now I’m equal, and the Constitution protects us equally’ 
(Tseki, 2001). 
 
NUMSA, like many other unions, has lost an entire generation of 
shop steward activists. Their replacements lack the historical memory of 
campaigning in the 1980s and, in many cases, they lack also a passion to 
bring about change.3 This was noted by the union’s legal officer: 
 
We don’t have the shop stewards like the older generation of shop 
stewards. The new shop stewards have better education, but we don’t 
have shop stewards who are activists like before. We have a few, but 
a few does not make the union strong (interview, Dumisani, 2001).  
 
The younger generation of union activists enter the union with ideas 
that reflect the downturn in political radicalisation that took hold in South 
Africa in the early 1990s. Former chairperson of the Wits Central-West 
regional executive, Moss Manganyi, notes that: 
 
There is a new generation which is taking a stand and who say: ‘We 
are born in a capitalist society and we can’t change capitalist society. 
We have to fit in, and transform it in a way that it suits us’ 
(interview, Manganyi, 2001). 
  
Although opinions vary on this matter, some veteran organisers 
suggest that the newer stewards do not respect the older members of the 
union, nor the past traditions of the union:  
 
The old guys complain about the new shop stewards who speak 
English and say ‘You must accept this, it comes from the Central 
Committee’. These old guys now they feel innocent, they feel 
ordered. The new ones just know now, after Mandela. Many new 
people act as if they’re clever (interview, Bheki, 2001). 
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Perhaps the most corrosive feature of the new political environment 
is the loss of the spirit of self-sacrifice and solidarity characteristic of the 
struggle years. Bheki, a long-time shop steward and organiser since 1985, 
lamented that: 
 
That thing that ‘An injury to one is an injury to all’, that’s nowhere 
now. Everyone is thinking for himself (interview, Bheki, 2001). 
 
And another: 
 
Before the LRA, workers would strike even over an individual 
worker. Now that is no more there. Now, the workers are choosing 
which issues they will strike for. To us, things were better [in the old 
days]… Before, if someone was dismissed, the workers would 
follow up to see how far the case had gone. Today, the slogan is ‘An 
injury to one...it’s that man’s baby!’ (interview, Vusi, 2001). 
 
The same organiser referred to the national campaign of solidarity with 
workers on strike at Simba Chips in 1984, an early FOSATU cause 
celebre: 
 
At that time, people were so committed, there was a consumer 
boycott to support that strike. Shop stewards were going all over the 
world to make the campaign successful. Never mind that you didn’t 
work for Simba Chips, it was covered by FOSATU and people 
showed solidarity. Nowadays, it’s very rare to see solidarity for other 
workers on strike, even within the same affiliate. Before, all the 
companies in the area would provide something for those workers, 
something for them to eat. Sometimes workers were involved in 
siyalalas [sleep-in strikes], and all the workers used to give them 
support, but not nowadays (interview, Vusi, 2001). 
 
The increasing pervasiveness of ‘looking after Number One’ is 
reflected in increasing interest in promotion out of manual work into office 
jobs, managerial positions, or political openings. During the 1980s there 
emerged what Dinga Sikwebu calls the ‘shiny shoe shop stewards’, union 
delegates hailing from the townships rather than the hostels, who had 
matriculated, and were proficient in English. Such delegates were 
obviously potential supervisory material in the eyes of management, but 
their prospects for promotion were limited by the overwhelming nature of 
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the political struggle. Shop stewards taking managerial positions were 
regarded as traitors by their fellow workers and were accordingly shunned.  
With political liberation in 1994, however, and with the example set 
by their national leaders fresh in their minds, the attraction of crossing sides 
has become much stronger for shop stewards and rather more common. In 
addition, companies are under pressure from the Employment Equity Act to 
meet affirmative action targets for appointment of blacks to managerial and 
supervisory positions, thereby creating more opportunities for promotion of 
stewards.  
There is a similar pull on union organisers. Buhlungu’s 1997 survey 
of full-time officials, including organisers, revealed some interesting 
statistics about their background and attitudes. Forty per cent of full-time 
officials had matriculated from high school, as against only 11.6 per cent of 
the black population aged over 20. One-third had a degree, as against less 
than 5 per cent of the black population.  Ninety per cent were at the prime 
of their working lives, aged 24–45. Most of these officials had no long-term 
commitment to the unions: 90 per cent had worked for the union movement 
for less than eight years and two-thirds expected to leave the movement 
within five years. Nearly 30 per cent thought that they would be out of the 
unions within two years. Only 21 per cent had a long-term (10 years plus) 
vision of working for the union movement (all data, Buhlungu, 1999). For 
such officials, managerial positions with better pay and conditions are both 
feasible and attractive. In 2001, NUMSA local organisers were paid R5,000 
per month, while human resource managers in the East Rand engineering 
industry were paid R15–20,000 per month, plus a car and other perks. 
Union organising, furthermore, is an exhausting vocation, as reported by 
Mzi, NUMSA organiser since 1990:  
 
We get home after 9 o’clock every night, we don’t get overtime pay, 
and 80 per cent of organisers and union activists are divorcees. If the 
workers are on strike, we have to stay with the workers, even if it’s a 
sleep-in. There are workshops at the weekends. The union won’t 
accept excuses about your domestic life. You have to be committed 
in this struggle. If you’re not, you will resign and go elsewhere 
(interview, 1997). 
 
Although the absolute numbers of stewards and organisers taking 
managerial positions in a single year in the region is not large, probably not 
more than a dozen, the effect is cumulative and constitutes an important 
trend throughout NUMSA operations. In some companies (for example, 
Bevcan (a subsidiary of Nampak) and Mercedes Benz), virtually the entire 
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human resources department comprises former shop stewards. In addition 
to departures to management appointments, we must consider union 
activists quitting for ANC Councillor positions in the townships. Whether 
union activists depart for managerial or political positions, however, the 
effect is the same: to accelerate turnover of established leaders and to foster 
a growing perception that trade union positions represent an avenue for 
upward mobility. 
Attitudes vary in regard to NUMSA activists quitting the movement 
for managerial jobs. Some argue that the union derives benefits. Tseki, 
shop steward and regional executive chairperson, argued that: 
 
If South Africa is to be productive, and there is no way that NUMSA 
is against productivity, we have to link it to training and 
empowerment. We say that we cannot leave the positions of 
management to be taken by people who don’t know what is trade 
unionism. We need managers who can understand the unions and the 
history of South Africa (interview, Zakhele, 2001). 
 
On the other hand, the constant turnover assorted with these movements 
has a demoralising effect, a feeling that ‘you can’t rely on your comrades 
anymore’, as long-established networks of activists are broken up. The 
promotion of working class activists is a mirror of trends in broader society. 
A shop steward at the giant Scaw factory voiced a common complaint that: 
 
In South Africa at the moment we are talking one language, that is 
money. Everyone wants to move to business, to get money. The 
same as people want positions in the Government, to get money. 
They say ‘I was starving financially, I want to get on’. It’s not that 
they want to be loyal to the Government, it’s just money (interview, 
anonymous Scaw shop steward, 1997). 
 
NUMSA organiser Bheki commented on the loss of the struggle traditions 
in the union: 
 
When you are a unionist, all the time in your mind you’ve got 
workers. The people who don’t know exactly what happens. The 
people who haven’t been at school. Everything starts with them. 
AIDS starts with them. Shortage of food and water, it’s them. Cut 
off electricity, cut off water, it happens to them. Is that what you’ve 
got in your mind? But today no-one has that in mind! Everyone 
thinks for himself. ‘I must have a cell [mobile phone]. I must have a 
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car, I must have a big house. I must have all the women’. But what 
the hell’s that? (interview, Bheki, 2001).  
 
In some cases employers are able to tap into this desire for social 
advance to eliminate shop stewards from the workplace. Vusi described the 
sequence: 
 
The employer goes to the worker and says ‘This is not a core 
business and we want to outsource it. We think you are a very 
intelligent chap and you can run this business on your own.’ They 
tell that person we are trying to empower blacks, and that person will 
just jump for this. When you try to ask the person, ‘How long do you 
think that this company will give you the business before they get 
someone else in who will do the job more efficiently?’ They say, 
‘No, no, no. This is black empowerment. You’re just jealous!’ 
(interview, organiser Vusi, 2001). 
 
As former activists seek to advance themselves, so their ideas begin 
to change, to ‘fit in’ with what is acceptable to those who control entry into 
favoured jobs. As Vusi explained: 
 
The ANC is very clever. There is one guy who is my friend who I 
recruited and pushed to become a shop steward. Now that company 
has been closed down. Now he is active in the ANC meetings. You 
know, when we meet, he is talking a different language. When I say 
that I don’t understand what is happening with the ANC, he says 
‘You expect delivery from the Government. If the Government does 
not privatise those things, how are they going to get money?’ But is 
it true that if the Government privatised things, people would get 
delivery? To me, the answer is no! People benefit nothing 
(interview, 2001). 
 
The process of personal advancement through the medium of union 
activism is accelerated by another gain of the 1980s which has now been 
inverted. The right to have shop stewards released from their work duties to 
attend union training programmes was an important advance in the 1980s 
and one which was consolidated in law with the Labour Relations Act 
1995. Given the ‘gravy train’ phenomenon (Buhlungu, 1994), however, 
such training opportunities raise the chances for ‘getting ahead’, at least for 
a minority of stewards. Dinga Sikwebu reports that stewards flock to 
accredited courses in industrial relations, human resource development and 
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project management organised by technical colleges and universities. This 
trend has two potentially harmful effects. First, it fosters managerial 
ideology within the ranks of the trade unions. This is particularly 
significant because the stewards who work in the larger companies and who 
attend such courses tend also to have disproportionate influence within 
NUMSA itself. Second, it gives graduates of these programs the potential 
to move out of union activism, thereby worsening the problem of turnover.4  
One other factor contributing to the decline in membership 
participation in union affairs since the early 1990s which was mentioned by 
many organisers was the corrosive impact of personal debt. In the 1980s, 
unions fought for and won the introduction of a provident fund, replacing 
the traditional pension scheme. The provident fund system has two great 
advantages over the pension. First, the provident fund can be accessed on 
quitting the job, rather than only on retirement. Second, financial 
institutions, and in particular loan sharks, recognise the provident fund as a 
form of collateral, and it may therefore be used as security for a mortgage 
or against a car loan or, indeed, for short-term ‘emergency money’ to 
supplement the weekly wage. Worker indebtedness has risen rapidly as a 
result, with detrimental effects on union activism. Fairly typical was the 
following comment by Bheki:  
 
These cash loans are killing our people. Because our people want 
higher things, they die forever. You want a car? You want a big 
house? They don’t want gradual things. They want to be seen higher. 
And they’re not going to attend union meetings. They’re stressed, 
they have their financial worries. Those are the things that kill our 
people and kill our organisations (interview, Bheki, 2001). 
 
The other damaging effect of personal debt is that it undermines the 
potential to resist retrenchments: 
 
As an organiser you rely on the workers for information. Now, when 
you go there, the first thing they ask you ‘How much is the 
severance pay?’. The issue of how to fight the retrenchment is not an 
issue for them. If you fight the members, they go to the employer, 
and say, ‘How much is the severance pay, I want to volunteer.’ 
(interview, Vusi, 2001).5 
 
In summary, the evidence gathered from interviews with organisers 
and local activists from the Wits East region of NUMSA suggests that 
participatory democracy and membership mobilisation are now under 
Social Movement Unionism since the Fall of Apartheid 
 
203
significant threat. Although the formal structures continue to exist and 
much of the rhetoric of mandate and accountability is apparent, the 
participatory element of democracy which animated the union in the 1980s 
– grassroots mobilisation – appears to be in the process of slowly 
disintegrating.  
 
 
Independence from political parties 
 
Ever since the formation of COSATU in 1985, the federation has been 
aligned with the ANC, and in that sense has never been politically ‘neutral’ 
or, still less, politically abstentionist. This policy reflects, and helps 
consolidate, electoral support for the ANC amongst union members 
(Ginsburg and Webster, 1995; Habib and Taylor, 1999; Wood and Psoulis, 
2001). Support for a political party by a union federation, however, must be 
distinguished from dependence. The fate of many African union 
movements has been one of subordination to post-colonial governments 
and their effective transformation into government agencies. It is this fate 
that FOSATU’s first president, Joe Foster, warned against in his 1982 
speech outlining the FOSATU vision (Foster, 1982). Twenty years later, it 
is clear that, although COSATU and its affiliates are by no means 
government agencies, they are very closely integrated into a political 
dispensation dominated by the ANC. 
The issue of COSATU subordination to the ANC Government since 
1994 is a recurring theme of many chapters in this volume (see McKinley 
and van Driel, this volume). Here I wish to focus on the specific case of 
NUMSA. NUMSA has traditionally been somewhat more independently 
minded than most COSATU affiliates in its relations with the ANC. Central 
to understanding this fact is the long-standing division within the union 
between the ANC-aligned leadership and an oppositional current of 
independent socialists, more critical of the ANC, many of whom hold 
important mid-level positions in the union and who have the respect of 
many grassroots militants. Although these two currents do not constitute 
hardened factions in any sense, debate within the union commonly revolves 
around the political positions advanced by the two ‘sides’, most evidently 
around the question of the alliance with the ANC. At NUMSA’s founding 
congress in 1987, the union endorsed the Freedom Charter, but argued at 
COSATU’s Second National Congress in the same year for a ‘Workers’ 
Charter’ which aimed to give the Freedom Charter a more distinctly 
socialist perspective (Baskin, 1991, pp. 215–22). Six years later, the anti-
charterist current succeeded in winning a vote at National Congress to 
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withdraw support for the alliance with the ANC, but this decision was 
subsequently overturned at the following Congress in 1996.  
In 2000, the ongoing debate between the ANC loyalists and the 
independent socialist minority was given an extra edge, as the candidate for 
the position of national secretary who was aligned with the latter, Dinga 
Sikwebu, was sacked from his position as national education officer shortly 
before the congress and only reinstated following an uproar  (Daniels, 
2000). At the congress, the ANC’s candidate, Slumko Nondwangu, only 
narrowly won the position, with four of the union’s nine provinces 
supporting Sikwebu’s candidacy.  
The division within the union and the support that exists for a more 
critical stance in relation to the ANC amongst the grassroots membership 
helps explain the union leadership’s regular criticisms of ANC Government 
policies, most notably GEAR. In 1998, NUMSA argued against COSATU 
deploying any of its leaders for the 1999 parliamentary elections, and in 
2000 the union was the sternest critic of the Government’s Millenium 
Labour Council, which aimed to marginalise union input into discussions 
around amendments to the Labour Relations Act (see Appolis and Sikwebu, 
this volume). 
Notwithstanding the ongoing debates within the union, the years of 
political retreat since the highpoint of struggle in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, and the domination of the ANC within the Tripartite Alliance, have 
served to swing the debate within NUMSA in favour of the ANC-aligned 
leadership at national and local level. Allegiances to the ANC Government 
are not just ideological but personal. The redeployment of NUMSA leaders 
such as Bernie Fanaroff, Alec Erwin, John Gomomo, and Enoch 
Gondongwana has cemented strong bonds between ANC and NUMSA 
leaders at national and provincial level. These bonds can then be organised 
to mutual advantage, the clearest demonstration of this being the array of 
forces that was mobilised against the 1,300 dissident NUMSA members at 
the Volkswagen plant at Uitenhage in the Eastern Cape in the first half of 
2000 (Rachleff, 2001).6 The outcome was the sacking of the Volkswagen 
workers, the restoration of political control by the NUMSA regional office, 
and security of export production.  
That political ties between NUMSA and Government ministers are 
now used, not as a means of pressing working-class demands on the 
Government, but as a means of transmitting Government demands on the 
union’s membership, was clear from a speech given by former NUMSA 
Education Officer, now Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, at the 
NUMSA bargaining conference in 2001. Erwin admonished the NUMSA 
leadership for ‘losing control’ at Volkswagen: 
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You don’t know how much damage that [strike] did…We had to 
send cabinet ministers to Germany on the VW dispute to convince 
them. Their concern – ‘Your best union can’t hold its factories’… If 
you want jobs you will have to show that as NUMSA, you are the 
union in the auto industry. If you can’t show that, your agreements 
will get worse and worse, and we will get no investors (NUMSA 
News, June 2001, p. 4). 
 
The leadership’s clampdown on the Volkswagen dissidents is 
indicative of a concern expressed by several organisers in the Wits East 
region, namely a fear of expressing one’s opinion openly, especially if such 
an opinion should be counter to the political line of COSATU and the 
SACP. Some union veterans report that the solidification of the Tripartite 
Alliance has been accompanied by growing intolerance towards any voices 
critical of the ANC. COSATU’s position as leader of the liberation forces 
in the second half of the 1980s has now been inverted, with the federation 
playing a secondary role in relation to the ANC. Long-time NUMSA 
steward, Moss Manganyi, complained that:  
 
COSATU policy is now only ‘Build the ANC; Build the Tripartite 
Alliance’. Beyond that, nothing else for the shop stewards! They 
know nothing else than ‘Building the ANC, building the Communist 
Party’. In our days we would build the ANC for a particular purpose 
– so that you gain this. If you don’t gain this, then away! ... Today 
there is no package of demands. Whether they throw you out of your 
house, whether you’ve got no land, whether there’s no water or 
electricity, you still have to ‘Build the ANC’! (interview, Manganyi, 
2001). 
 
In summary, NUMSA’s leadership is ideologically and personally 
predisposed to close ties with the ANC Government but must contend with 
a more critical minority current within the union which is able to count on 
the support of many thousands of rank and file members who are sceptical, 
if not completely hostile, to the neoliberal drift of ANC Government policy. 
This situation prevents the tight identification of the union with the 
Government such as exists within, for example, the National Union of 
Mineworkers or the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union.  
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Links to non-workplace political struggles 
 
The issue of political independence has a clear bearing on the third feature 
of social movement unionism considered in this chapter – links with 
outside communities and interest in non-workplace issues and a vision of 
broader social change, as opposed to narrowly ‘economic unionism’. After 
some initial hesitation, MAWU/NUMSA was heavily involved during the 
1980s in community stay-aways, involving workers, students, and township 
residents (Ruiters, 1995). In the late 1980s, following the declaration of the 
State of Emergency, COSATU affiliates, including NUMSA, were the only 
force capable of mobilising millions behind the Mass Democratic 
Movement. In the early 1990s, NUMSA organisers took an active role in 
combating state-sponsored township violence in East Rand townships such 
as Katlehong.  
NUMSA has maintained a strong interest in non-workplace political 
campaigns since the coming of political democracy, both within South 
Africa and without, as a review of its triennial conference proceedings 
makes clear. The union has taken a consistent stand on measures to halt the 
spread of the AIDS virus endemic amongst the South African poor. It has 
also published extensive criticisms of ANC Government plans to privatise 
basic services.  
Nonetheless, it is also necessary to point out the ways in which past 
traditions have withered in this respect. In particular, with the end of the 
political struggle for liberation and the associated transformation of ANC 
structures and township politics, shop stewards are rarely involved in ANC-
aligned community politics. One organiser reports: 
 
Shop stewards don’t attend ANC structures in the townships. 
Previously, the shop stewards were the pivot of the ANC in the 
township. They didn’t participate in the union only. Now, those 
structures have collapsed and are led by people who are 
inexperienced. UDF structures are not there anymore: they used to 
pick up issues and mobilise. There’s no drive in the townships 
(interview, organiser Vusi). 
 
The collapse of township structures has created a vacuum which 
some community organisations have sought to fill. Non-union 
organisations, such as the various ‘crisis committees’, ‘community 
councils’ and ‘anti-privatisation forums’ in Johannesburg, Durban and 
Cape Town, have now become the main force on issues such as land rights 
and housing for the poor, electricity and water cut-offs. However, being 
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forced by necessity to confront ANC Councillors, Provincial Governments 
and, indeed, the national Government, these committees are invariably 
drawn into conflict with the ANC and, for this reason, their campaigns 
receive little support from a NUMSA leadership loyal to the Tripartite 
Alliance and thus extremely sensitive to any accusations that it is ‘rocking 
the boat’ by giving comfort to non-party activists, sometimes dismissed as 
‘ultra-lefts’. The union’s support for the Tripartite Alliance has clearly led 
to a narrowing of its preparedness to engage in the kind of community 
campaigns that it would once have endorsed (see van Driel, this volume). 
 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine whether the traditions of 
social movement unionism embedded in COSATU in the 1980s still 
survive two decades later. In the case of NUMSA Wits East, it appears that 
three of the most important features of SMU – internal democracy, 
independence from political parties, and links to non-workplace political 
struggles, are under threat. The dominant factor explaining this shift has 
been the change in the wider political context. The consolidation of the new 
political dispensation that has emerged since the unbanning of the ANC and 
SACP in 1990 has seen a transformation in the culture of unionism in the 
factories. Unions have gone from being a leading force in a liberation 
struggle to the loyal partner of a governing party undertaking a neoliberal 
restructuring of the South African economy. The rationale of union action 
has gone from mass mobilisation, aimed at smashing both racial oppression 
and class oppression, to expert representation, aimed at marginal 
improvements in wages and working conditions, accompanied by 
increasingly tokenistic political campaigns directed at a Government with 
which the union movement is in alliance. This change in the political 
context has had a fundamental effect on the organising environment within 
the union: mobilisation has given way to passivity, self sacrifice to self-
promotion, mass organising to legalism and institutionalisation, and 
political engagement to political alienation.  
More broadly, this single case study suggests that social movement 
unionism may be a conjunctural phenomenon arising out of political 
repression. Once repression is removed, the institutional processes tend to 
pull trade unionism away from its oppositional bias towards integration, 
much as occurred in Western Europe and North America by the 1950s. 
Social movement unionism in post-apartheid South Africa therefore 
appears to be giving way to the type of social partnership unionism 
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common to Continental Europe, but without the material gains associated 
with the latter (Hyman, 1996). Unfortunately, space prevents further 
exploration of this important question in this chapter.  
Although the moving force of social movement unionism appears to 
be on the retreat within NUMSA and COSATU more broadly, it is 
important to understand the counter-tendencies that exist. Just as the 
thoroughly institutionalised European and North American unions were 
shaken by a wave of working class struggle in the 1960s and 1970s (Crouch 
and Pizzorno, 1978), so too the process of institutionalisation amongst 
South African unions may be reversed by mass movements from below. 
The potential certainly exists. Despite gains, black workers still commonly 
subsist in destitute circumstances, in an environment in which the wealth of 
the white minority has barely been touched and in which a minority of their 
own former leaders have now been absorbed into economic privilege. 
Unemployment amongst blacks is 40 per cent or more. Probably the 
majority of the black workforce are not covered by any meaningful labour 
protection, either from unions or from legislation, because they work in the 
unregulated sectors or sectors where government agencies or trade unions 
have little or no influence.  
Members of NUMSA and other COSATU affiliates are acutely 
aware of these facts. Right-wing business and political commentators allege 
that the existence of such conditions means that black union members are 
part of a privileged elite. In reality, these conditions serve only to retard the 
overall living standards of black families which include union members, the 
unemployed, and the ‘informally’ employed. Such conditions therefore 
provide further fuel for union members’ resentment at the fact that political 
liberation in 1994 has done very little to advance the economic interests of 
black workers. The outcome may in the end be a conscious rejection of 
union institutionalisation in favour of a return to some of the organising 
principles of social movement unionism used with such success in the 
struggle years and which contributed immensely to the destruction of 
apartheid.  
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NOTES 
 
1 Research was undertaken over four months in 1997 and two months in 2001, during which 
time I reviewed primary and secondary sources on NUMSA, and conducted interviews with 
a number of both current and former office bearers, organisers, union officers, and shop 
stewards. These respondents were selected on the basis of their long experience as NUMSA 
activists and members, in some cases going back to the early days of MAWU in the mid-
1970s. Average length of interviews was two hours. In addition to interviews, I also 
attended union workshops and meetings of the Springs and Wadeville shop stewards 
councils, and accompanied NUMSA organisers on several factory visits. I would like to 
thank Bafana Ndebele and George Choshane, Wits East regional secretaries in 1997 and 
2001 respectively, for authorising my research. Thanks are also due to NUMSA Research 
Officer, Jenny Grice, for assisting in my project. I would like to record my appreciation to 
all those who agreed to be interviewed for my research but who bear no responsibility for 
the content of this chapter nor its interpretations. In the text pseudonyms are used for the 
organisers and the regional chairperson. 
2 For more discussion on this point, see the chapter by Appolis and Sikwebu in this volume. 
3 A 2001 survey by NUMSA head office revealed that 65 per cent of the union’s members 
had joined since 1990. 
4 For more on this point, see interview with Appolis and Sikwebu in this volume. See also 
Bonner (2000). 
5 See also an article by Philemon Shiburi in NUMSA News, June 2001, on this point. 
6 See also Forrest (2000) for a different interpretation of the VW dispute. 
